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Abstract
Physical security controls aim to reduce risk through their ability to systematically deter, or detect,
delay and respond against deviant acts within a risk context. Holistically the aim is to increase the
difficulty and risks while reducing the rewards associated with an act of deviance as captured in
Clarke’s Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) framework. The efficacious implementation of such
controls commensurate with the risk context requires a considered undertaking referred as informed
decision‐making. Informed decision‐making is effective when a suitable choice is made accordant
with base rate data that achieves its defined objectives within costs versus benefits framework. The
study examined the feasibility of developing a decision support tool to enhance the selection of a
suitable barrier fence system, in‐line with defence in depth to increase the efforts and risks, and
reduce the rewards associated with unlawful access. The study found that a decision support tool can
be developed comprising of the various contextual inputs and their relationships in achieving a
contextually suitable barrier fence system, as a result enhancing the selection of situational crime
prevention elements.
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INTRODUCTION
Physical security is concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel, prevent
unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material and documents as well as protection
against espionage, sabotage, damage and theft (Browning, 2008, p. 1; Field Manual, 2001, p.47; GAO,
2004, p. 3). The characteristics of physical security controls include measures for deterrence,
detection, delay and response elements to mitigate risks and enhance operational effectiveness
(ASIS, 2009, p. 10; Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 2004, p. 1; Standards Australia, 2006, pp. 60‐63)
by increasing the difficulty and risks, and reducing the rewards as captured in Clarke’s Situational
Crime Prevention (SCP) framework (Lab, 2013, pp. 216‐219). This framework arguably provides a
rubric to engage in the professional tasks of diagnosis, inference and treatment as they relate to
solving a security or crime risk problem. Detailed knowledge across the rubric’s constituent strategies
can facilitate the inference process leading to enhanced decision making in the face of a range of
alternative options.
Informed decision‐making occurs across all professional domains. For physical security, the aim of
such decision‐making is towards implementing security controls, which efficaciously reduce risk and
facilitate organizational objectives in sector‐specific and dynamic environments that are cost
effective accordant with the economic law of diminishing returns (Broekhuis & Vos, 2003; Series 3,
n.d.).
The study examined the feasibility of developing a decision support tool to enhance the selection of a
suitable barrier fence system, in‐line with defence in depth to increase the efforts and risks, and
reduce the rewards associated with unlawful access. The study found that a decision support tool
could be developed that considers the various contextual inputs and their relationships in achieving a
contextually suitable barrier fence system. By comparing a set of alternative constituent elements
systematically within the security risk and environmental context, findings showed that the decision
making process in the form of a decision matrix can guide the selection process.
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DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF DECISION MAKING TOOLS FOR PERIMETER BARRIER EVALUATION
In the security domain, decision‐making is reflected through security risk management, towards
developing a constructed understanding of the nature of uncertainty on objectives. This constructed
understanding aims to facilitate more informed decision‐making and offers capacity to exploit
opportunities, whilst minimizing harms that threaten an organization (Standards Australia, 2006, pp.
6‐10). Such an approach is documented as a formal systematic process that includes identifying
exposure to risk, evaluating methods to manage risk, applying treatment strategies, ongoing
performance monitoring of strategies and employing necessary feedback to adjust strategies where
necessary (Hatfield & Hipel cited in Coole, 2010, p.1).
Security risk management emphasizes the key elements of organizational security controls that
contribute to the management of risk via their ability to deter, detect, delay, respond and recover
from damages (Coole, 2010, p. 2; Standards Australia, 2006, p. 63). As follows, acceptable risks are a
combination of unique elements within each risk, with decisions based on the costs‐benefit analysis
of protecting assets in relation to assessed risk level, for corresponding levels of treatment controls
(Burns‐Howell, Cordier & Erikson, cited in Coole, 2010, p. 2). Here, the implementation of physical
security controls aims to reduce offending opportunities, which in accordance with Situational Crime
Prevention (SCP) can be targeted towards increasing the level of difficulty through target hardening,
increasing the risks through surveillance and reducing rewards. SCP can be executed in accordance
with the theory of defence in depth (Coole, Corkill & Woodward, 2012), which links layered security
elements into a system incorporating people, technology, barriers and procedures to ensure a
holistic and functional protective posture (Smith, 2003, p. 8). This approach arguably applies a body
of relevant knowledge to inform the risk reduction decision process.
Informed decision processes aim to deliver effective risk based choices along with enhanced
operational effectiveness (Coole, 2010, p. 2). As part of the informed decision making process,
selective or support tools in other disciplines and industries have been developed including the areas
of agriculture, utilities, economics and psychology (CSIRO, 2013; Palaniappan, Lang & Gleick, 2008).
Such tools are a synthesis of the best available science and management knowledge, brought
together to assist in the decision making process as many of these tools are based on computer
models. For example, in agriculture the tools provide timely and valuable information to better
understand farm and land management systems. MetAccess™ uses daily climate records to assist
farmers in estimating probable weather conditions at critical times in their production cycles;
selecting from a range of alternative crop and pasture varieties according to likely weather conditions
(CSIRO, 2013).
Furthermore, within utilities field, the decision‐making tools help address technological needs,
guiding practitioners to the most appropriate water and sanitation solutions (Brikké & Bredero,
2003). These tools provide essential information on the types of water‐supply and sanitation
technologies available, including descriptions of their operation and maintenance requirements
(Palaniappan, Lang & Gleick, 2008). Software such as WAWTTAR ‐ Water and Wastewater Treatment
Technologies Appropriate for Reuse Model is a Microsoft Windows based program, designed to assist
engineers, planners and decision makers in improving their strategies for sustainable water and
sanitation coverage, while minimizing impacts on water resources (Finney & Gearheart, 2004).
In security domain, the decision tools have been developed with many focused towards identifying
and evaluating risk, rather than the selection of efficacious reduction controls. For example, Riskware
(2013) is a software program based on Microsoft NET technology that assists to identify and access,
control and manage potential impacts to the organization, using risk management according to
AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009. In addition, Estimated Adversary Sequence Interruption (EASI) model is a
quantitative decision support tool used in the security domain. EASI represents a systems
commissioning or operational macro‐state level, and can be used to inform the probability of
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interrupting (Pi) an adversary in a layered defense, towards ensuring that constituent decisions
combine to achieve a defined system objective for the security plan (Garcia, 2001).
Consistent with other domains, the aim is to develop a broader suite of tools for security risk
management beyond risk identification software or total system synthesis (EASI), focusing on the
constituent selection. Such tools would enable decision makers to compare their multiple treatment
alternatives concurrently and facilitate an enhanced risk treatment decision through the elimination
of options that are not contextually suitable, producing an optimal business solution (Business
Analysis Made Easy: Decision Making, 2012). In many domains, such tools are often reflected as a
decision matrix; where traditionally elements represent the values for each possible alternative in a
range, to select the best alternative in terms of the highest probability of success within a context
(Brachinger & Monney, n.d.). Therefore, decision makers must have the means to identify essential
criteria and integrate them into a model that will facilitate their assessment and prioritization to
enable informed, cost‐effective decision choices within a context (“Business Analysis Made Easy:
Decision Making,” 2012).
Study Objectives
The study sought to develop a decision support tool for selecting physical barrier elements among
possible alternatives for controlling access to a protected site. The tool presents the various
contextual inputs and their relations required for comparing a set of alternative barrier options to
facilitate enhanced decision‐making within this protective context. Therefore, the study posed the
following Research Questions:
1.
What criteria can be used for an evaluation process of security barrier fences?
2.
Can a decision support tool be developed through a literature critique to aid in the selection
of barrier fence construction elements within context of asset protection?
UNDERLYING THEORY
Decision theories focus towards explaining how people do make decisions (descriptive), or
prescribing how people should make decisions (prescriptive) (Grant & Van Zandt, 2007, p. 2).
Therefore, the study drew on the principles of Expected Utility Theory (ETU) (Bernoulli, 1738; Grant &
Van Zandt, 2007) and Innovation Theory (Clarke, 1995) to understand, examine and map the
representation of the various feature inputs and their organisation most suitable for comparing a set
of alternative product constituent elements in barrier fence design. Such mapping allows a means of
expressing how barrier fence decisions should be developed (Bernoulli, 1738; Clarke, 1995; Fishburn,
1970; Mongin, 1997).
The word utility is generally associated or synonymous with a benefit property, advantage, good or
happiness with relation to assets or an object (Kapteyn, 1985, p. 1). For this reason Expected Utility
Theory (EUT) considers that a decision maker chooses between numerous alternatives by comparing
their expected utility values. In traditional EUT models, weighted sums are obtained by adding the
utility values of potential outcomes multiplied by the likelihood of success to produce a desirable
decision position (Bernoulli, 1738). Therefore, the expectation is considered with respect to the
selected, well‐defined norms or criteria of probability and utility function of the alternatives
(Fishburn, 1970; Mongin, 1997). The utility criterion considers the expected utility in terms of benefit
or functionality for each alternative product element and provides an indication of that alternative
accordant with the highest expected value (benefit/functionality) (“Decision Theory” n.d.; Weber &
Coskunoglu, 1990, p.311).
Innovation theory describes and categorizes objectives, and perceived, contextual influencing factors
that lead to successful adoptions or implementation of products or individual product elements
within organizational decision frameworks (Marshal & Rossman, 1999, p. 50), as a dynamic multilevel
process (Marshal & Rossman, 1999, p. 49). The innovation‐decision making process is also realized
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through a cost‐benefit analysis with major obstacle being uncertainty where an innovation, with all
things considered, has the potential to enhance utility (Clarke, 1995). As a consequence, expected
utility and innovation theory provided the theoretical frame for exploring decision making within the
physical security domain to achieve an optimal solution based on individual characteristics of a range
of solution options.
DECISION MAKING
Decision making derives from prior preferences and expectations about consequences, directed by
considerable individual and organizational constrains on realizing an optimal solution (March, 1991).
According to March (1991) decisions often stem from logic of suitability rather than consequential
choices and so Wallenius, et al. (2008) recognizes that a decision maker chooses one or a subset of a
set of alternatives evaluated on the basis of two or more criteria or attributes. Conceptually, the
decision maker acts to maximize utility or value function that depends on the criteria or attributes
and in cases of uncertainty, maximize the expected value of utility function.
Giere (1991) articulates that decision problems involve a set of options, possible courses of action
and a set of possible consequences of alternative options represented as a matrix. Traditionally, the
elements of the matrix are composed in pairs consisting of one option and one possible consequence
labeled outcomes and signify achieving a particular consequence having chosen a specified course of
action. The representation of value denotes a rank ordering of the outcomes according to their
relative importance or desirability (Giere, 1991, p.187). Subsequently, a decision matrix provides the
means of systematic resources or numerical modeling used to evaluate and prioritize a list of options
against criteria, with the highest ranking option designated as the most suitable solution. The options
are compared rationally and logically, with the pros and cons being listed and ranked in importance.
Security Decision Making
Currently, a decision tool for assessing and rating the construction elements for intruder resistance
for physical security control barriers is defined in Standards Australia AS3555.1 (2003). The
construction elements for intruder resistance include walls, floors and ceilings used in commercial or
domestic premises, along with inferred attacks types and evaluation of working time required for
breaching each element. The Standard also offers a destructive testing of these elements. However,
the testing does not provide a conclusive indication of the most appropriate barrier or elements for a
security context as it provides a working delay time only against defined threat scenarios and does
not consider other variables that interact with any barrier elements decision. Consequently, the
Standard cannot facilitate the determination and evaluation of alternative criteria for selecting
security barrier products or elements within any given corporation, industrial or domestic context
(Standards Australia, 2003, p. 2).
METHODOLOGY
The study employed a qualitative action research approach to investigate the fusing of decision
making literature and research within the domain of physical security for the selection of barrier
fence elements. Such fusion was achieved by using a literature critique in an annotated bibliography
format (N=26), to identify patterns and themes or relationships among patterns and themes in the
reviewed data corpus (McMillan & Schumacher 1993, p. 479), which were fused to produce a single
source planning tool (Figure.1).
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Figure.1: Study phases and analysis

Analysis
The study drew on an interpretative inductive approach through thematic analysis for identifying,
analysing, and reporting patterns and themes within the reviewed literature. Accordant with the
works of Spradley (1979), hierarchical taxonomic tables (folk taxonomy) were then developed where
data was organized according to its perceived relationships with other data, where deductively sets
of subcategory (subordinate) data fell beneath a certain higher category (superordinate), and that
category fell beneath an even higher level category. Johnson and Christensen (2004, p. 511) explain
the study adopted process with a fruit analogy:
“In the case of fruit, some possible subcategories are oranges, grapefruit, kiwi, apples
and bananas. These are all subcategories because they are part of or types of the
higher level category called fruit. Yet the category of fruit maybe the subcategory of a
higher category called food group. Systems of categories such as this are called
hierarchies because they are layered or fall into different levels”.
Such taxonomies are a means of expressing through inference how the elements of a domain are
internally organized, and are represented by different levels with superordinate and subordinate
relations which unless explored remain tacitly below the surface (Spradley, 1979, pp. 137‐138).
BARRIER AND DECISION MAKING ELEMENTS
Study Phase.1a and Phase.1b extracted the barrier and decision constituents. The thematic analysis
identified the following categories within the specifics of physical security barriers consisting of:
attack types, environmental conditions, supplementary fixings, progression impediment, fence cost
and legal requirements. The subsequent categories further formed integral part of the resulting
themes: defined threat, effectiveness, barrier design, deterrence, and delay time with difficulty level.
In response to research question 1, the review found that the threat of scaling or climbing was a
salient factor in barrier fence selection, with scaling or climbing occurring 77 times across the
reviewed texts. Consistent with this criteria topping was another input factor occurring saliently
across the reviewed texts, occurring 74 times, these criteria were supported by height as a decision
factor, occurring 53 times. In addition, the ability of the barrier to support detection was another
significant decision factor, with detection occurring 51 times throughout the reviewed texts.
Deterrence as a value occurred 47 times throughout the sampled text and was followed by delay or
delay time as another salient factor in barrier selection, occurring 39 times across the reviewed texts.
Finally, the threat of cutting was another salient design consideration, occurring 33 times across the
reviewed texts.
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The extracted key words provided the functional utility inputs associated with a contextually suitable
barrier fence to be taken forward to develop a phase hierarchical taxonomic table of barrier selection
constituent elements and their relationships with other constituent elements. Table.1 indicates the
relationships between the descriptive key words, particular categories and themes with defined
threat and context as the drivers for evaluation and selection of physical security barriers.
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Scaling, 34Climbing,

33

Jumping,

Attack
Types

35

Tunneling,

36

Cutting,

37

Vehicle penetration/breach/crash,

39

Crawling,

40

Ramming,
5

Defined
Threat

Cost,
Degradation,
8
Maintenance,
9
Material elements,
23
Instalation,
28
Deterioration,
17
Soil,
18
Terrain,
19
Climate,
29
Nature,
14
Landscape,
7

Fence Cost

Environmental
Conditions
Barrier
Design

Legal Requirements

6

Social acceptability,
Location,
30
Safety,
27

Effectiveness

Supplementa
ry Fixings

24

Toppings,

25

Top Guard,
Detection,
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Delay time
4

Height,
Barrier
foundation,
12
Placement,
13
Structure,
16
Stand‐off
distance,
22
Construction,
26
Clear Zone,
11

Progression
Impediments

Deterrence

Difficulty level

Table.1: Taxonomy of Physical Security Barrier Characteristics

The decision making extraction revealed constituents of decision making (Table.2), where within the
reviewed text the concept of probability in terms of success was the salient variable considered,
occurring 89 times across the reviewed text. The concept of probability was supported by
preferences in terms of choice options, occurring 24 times across the reviewed texts. Value was also
a salient decision element occurring 43 times throughout the reviewed text, as was utility or utility
function, occurring 31 times throughout the reviewed texts. Combined these extracted key words
provided the decision making principles associated with a contextually optimal solution to be taken
forward to develop a phase hierarchical taxonomic table of decision making constituent factors and
their relationships with other constituent factors towards achieving an optimal decision.
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Organizational
objectives
Cultural Bias
Context

Objective function
Feasibility

Expected
Utility
Objective

x

Probability
Distribution

Preferences
Effectiveness

Highest Expected
Value

Expected utility,
Expert
knowledge/Knowledge
g
Utility/ wUtility function,
f
Value,
d
Cost‐nonfinancial,
l
Decision
weights/Weighting,
k

Attributes of
Alternatives

Cost‐Benefit
Table.2: Taxonomy of Organizational Decision Making

Deductive Analysis
In response to research question 2, the study Phase.2 identified and extracted consistent criteria and
their relations, with the processes required for objectively evaluating decision options in security
barrier fence selection. As physical security is embodied within systematic measures of deterrence,
detection and delay (Defence in Depth), along with security risk management, the security barrier
decision making process is integrated into the evaluation of each alternative (Table.3). The
distributed representations of designated utility, the evaluation criteria signify meaning not
represented by a single symbolic unit (individual criterion) rather summarize meaning from the
interaction of a set of units (criteria in matrix). Effective decision making should consider the
alternative options, their organization and weighting in terms of utility function for the decision
objective.
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Barrier design

Progression
Impediments

Legal
Concerns

Height

Toppings

Difficulty
Supplementary Fittings

Energy
Systems

Detection

Surveillance

Foundation

Delay
sec.

Rating
A/S

Effectiveness
Threat

Deterrence

Cost
Per linear
meter

Installation

Maintenance

Soil

Climbing
Jumping
Tunneling
Cutting
Vehicle
Terrain
Sand
Clay
Rock
Cyclone
Rain Fall
Heat
Salt
Safety
Social
Acceptability
Location
Structural
Climate

Environmental
Conditions

Attack
Types

Material
Elements

Natural
Clear zone
Stand‐off
Distance
Table.3: Barrier Fence Decision Matrix
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Feasibility

PHYSICAL BARRIER DECISION MAKING TOOL
The study objective considered security’s lack of functional treatment decision support tools. As
such, it aimed to investigate the salient, constituent component criteria, combined to produce a
contextually suitable barrier system organized in such a way so that an informed decision can be
achieved. Such a barrier selection tool, if effective, should produce a system of sound construction
for the context, support risk reduction through its targeted features in relation to the defined threat,
consider additional elements required or desired including intrusion detection support and
surveillance requirements, be socially acceptable and cost effective within the security risk context.
The selection of barrier elements is often conducted at the project design phase, sometimes many
years before a project is realized. Consequently, barrier selection must be undertaken accordant to
some predefined base rate data that sets a baseline where standards can be grounded from. What is
more, during the project development life cycle some stakeholders seek to implement changes in
either barrier construction or fittings, resulting in a variation to contract and cost overrun for that
constituent, sometimes due to wants rather than needs. As such, an appropriate decision support
tool becomes an essential component of the project documentation, clearly highlighting and
formally documenting why design decisions were made. The decision support tool provides a project
baseline, where variations can be contextually considered in relation to the original planning
decisions. Additionally, the decision support tool delivers a documental means to separate wants
from needs within the barrier system, where environmental or threat changes can be directly
mapped to the original decision and proposed changes mapped to environmental or threat changes.
Furthermore, functional decision tools have been developed in other domains. For security, most
decision tools relate to risk but do not facilitate the selection of components to reduce risk. The
study identified the specific criteria (Table.3) required for an effective evaluation of security barrier
elements in risk reduction. Such criteria were extracted, cognizant of the systematic application of
deterrence, detection, delay and response (Defence‐in‐depth) used to achieve a state of effective
security. The security decision‐making process was integrated into the evaluation accordant with
each alternative, as they combine to produce a barrier system.
The study outcomes highlighted the salient choice criteria, their relationships and the characteristics
to be met for the security project context. Here, the established criteria denote the designated
utility (organizational context) and so influence the alternatives to be considered for an optimal
outcome within the relevant protective project.
For that reason, the Security Barrier Decision Matrix (Table.3) becomes the means of systematically
modeling a decision making process by creating a logical evaluation path. Thus, such a path
structures decision making in a way that enables clear identification and justification of various
contextual inputs required for element selection among alternative products. In addition, for later
reviews that lead to a change in design due to altered actual or perceived need, changing contextual
threats and other factors that could alter, the path provides a benchmark to understand how and
why such a barriers design was reached.
LIMITATIONS
The study included a number of limitations. Firstly, with qualitative research the researcher is the
main data collection instrument, as a result, beliefs, values, predispositions may have influenced the
extraction and analysis process (Hughes, 2006). Secondly, the data corpus (N=26) was a limited
sample in terms of the potential broader literature, with six documents forming the data set of
decision making and 20 reviewed documents forming the data set for specifics of physical security
barrier selection where time constraints limited a broader literature extraction. Thirdly, the matrix
was subjected to expert review but it was not subjected to a broad sample of security experts for
validation. Conversely, the aim of the study was to inform of the salient, constituent elements and
their organisation in terms of optimal decision making, where the reviewed data corpus along with
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expert review provided for this evaluation. The development of a suite of decision support tools is an
iterative process. As such, the study sought to establish the first iteration towards the development
of a more refined tool through further research.
FURTHER RESEARCH
The study recommends undertaking further research in the area of decision support tools for
enhanced security decision making. This should include fusing a broad depth of literature which is
supported through expert interviews and further refinement through trial evaluations. Given the
financial costs and potential consequences of poor decision making within security domain, it is
essential for security to mature as an established science; therefore researchers must pursue more
functional tools. Such tools should facilitate the employment of criminology and security theory with
best practice principles into effective security risk management decision making.
CONCLUSION
The study sought to explore whether a decision support tool, based on the available literature, could
be developed to aid in the selection of barrier fence construction elements within context of asset
protection as first iteration. Findings indicate that both decision making literature and barrier
elements can be combined and organized in such a manner to facilitate enhanced barrier fence
elements decision making. Outcomes included a series of criteria inputs, organized systematically to
enhance the project evaluation process for selecting optimal fence elements to mitigate risk and
facilitate organizational objectives for sector‐specific, dynamic environment to safeguard people,
process and technology. The study established the feasibility of researching to develop a series of
decision support tools for physical security treatment controls.
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